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 Overview 
 In 2012, Lord Justice Toulson observed that the 
practical application of open justice  ‘ may need 
reconsideration from time to time to take account 
of changes in the way society and the courts work ’ . 1 
In this article, we undertake such a reconsideration 
in light of the declining role that institutional media 
organisations play in promoting and protecting 
the principle of open justice, focusing on courts in 
England and Australia. We argue that due to changes 
in the communications landscape, the media no 
longer have the resources or sufficient inclination 
to adequately safeguard the public interest in 
transparency in the courts. In order to place the 
media ’ s declining role into context, we also briefly 
explore three further categories of contemporary 
challenges facing the open justice principle: changes 
to judicial attitudes to open justice in response 
to new communication technologies; shifts in 
the priority given in law to competing interests in 
national security and privacy; and, finally, new and 
emerging changes to court processes and procedures 
that potentially limit open justice, including virtual 
courts. We then consider mechanisms that would 
offer enhanced protection of open justice. Most 
boldly, we examine a novel model in which an open 
justice advocate (OJA) intervenes in appropriate 
circumstances, with the overall objective of ensuring 
maximum transparency of court proceedings. We 
also suggest additional mechanisms for greater 
transparency and accountability regarding the state 
of open justice in the courts  – namely, a statutory 
duty on courts to give written public reasons for all 
decisions regarding open justice, a public register of 
all reporting restrictions (and similar orders) granted 
by the courts, and annual open justice reporting 
requirements. 
 IIntroduction 
 Trials have been conducted in public since  ‘ time 
immemorial ’ . 2 However, it was not until just over 
100 years ago in the seminal case of  Scott v Scott 3 that 
the House of Lords formally recognised the principle 
of open justice  – the principle that justice must not 
only be done but must be seen to be done  – as 
fundamental to the administration of justice under the 
common law and as  ‘ a sound and very sacred part of 
the constitution ’ of England. 4 Since then, protection of 
the principle has been expressly enshrined in Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (the right to a  ‘ fair 
and  public hearing ’ ), 5 and has also been interpreted 
as an aspect of the right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the ECHR. 6 Likewise, the principle 
is recognised in various international human rights 
instruments, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 7 and as an express 
or implied guarantee in the written constitutions of 
many nations. 8 
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the difficulties with, adopting effective alternative 
mechanisms for defending the principle, we also 
canvass in Part III a series of further contemporary 
challenges, both present and future, that have the 
potential to place increasing pressure upon the 
operation of open justice in the courts. 
 In Part IV we then examine how the open justice 
principle might be safeguarded into the future. First, 
we explore the possibility of a fully stated-funded 
OJA to represent the principle of open justice in the 
courts. We examine what role an OJA might perform 
and the interests that it might protect, and how the 
participation of the OJA might be accommodated 
in the courts from a case management perspective. 
We then explore a number of other mechanisms that 
might be adopted, either independently or alongside 
an OJA  – namely: a statutory duty on courts to give 
publicly available written reasons for all decisions 
where departures from open justice are ordered; 
the adoption of a register of all orders affecting open 
justice; and, finally, the introduction of annual open 
justice reporting requirements. 
 IIDeclining role of the media 
in open justice 
 Since the rise of the popular press, the media have 
played a significant role in the law and practice of 
open justice in two important respects. The first is the 
media ’ s role in facilitating open justice by reporting 
on proceedings before the courts. While public 
attendance at court was once  ‘ a common mode of 
 ‘ passing the time ’ , 21 nowadays very few members of 
the public attend and observe judicial proceedings. 
Instead, members of the public rely predominantly 
upon court reporting by the mainstream media 
to receive information about the operation of the 
courts. In this respect, a crucial aspect of the modern 
principle of open justice is the mainstream media ’ s 
role in acting as the  ‘ eyes and ears ’ of the public by 
reporting the workings of the courts. 22 The special 
role of the media in furthering the goals of open 
justice has been frequently recognised by the courts. 23 
For example, Cory J in  Edmonton Journal v Alberta 
(Attorney-General) said: 
 It is only through the press that most individuals 
can really learn of what is transpiring in the 
courts. They as  ‘ listeners ’ or readers have a right 
to receive this information. Only then can they 
make an assessment of the institution. Discussion 
of court cases and constructive criticism of court 
 Under the common law, at least three fundamental 
rules flow from the open justice principle: first, 
judicial proceedings must be conducted in open 
court; 9 second, evidence must not be concealed 
from members of the public who are present in 
court; 10 and, third, what happens in court must be 
able to be communicated to the public outside of 
the court, including by the media. 11 Such rules must 
be followed in all cases except where departure 
from them is necessary to protect the fair and proper 
administration of justice or is permitted or required by 
statute. The rationales for the open justice principle 
and the rules that flow from it tend to be framed in 
utilitarian terms: that is, open justice is a  ‘ means to 
an end, but not an end in itself. ’ 12 Openness and 
public scrutiny of the courts, which are achieved 
largely through media coverage, are said to guard 
against the exercise of arbitrary or partial decision-
making, 13 to provide  ‘ an impetus for high judicial 
performance ’ , 14 and to ensure that all participants 
in court proceedings, including witnesses, are held 
to account. 15 Open justice also serves an educative 
function, by providing a mechanism for the public 
to learn about court processes as well as what the 
law is and what standards of behaviour it requires. 16 
These effects of open justice are considered central 
to securing public confidence in the administration 
of justice and, in turn, the ongoing authority of 
the judiciary. 17 Open justice is therefore seen as 
fundamental to the operation of the rule of law 18 and 
is an essential precept of any modern democratic 
system of government. 19 
 The purpose of this article is to explore the media ’ s 
declining role as the institutional defender of the 
open justice principle in the courts and to consider 
how the principle can be safeguarded into the future. 
As we discuss in Part II, the fragmentation of media 
markets due to new communication technologies 
has significantly undermined the mainstream media ’ s 
traditional capacity  – and inclination  – to devote 
resources to reporting the courts. Crucially, this 
fragmentation has also resulted in fewer resources 
for the mainstream media to fulfil their traditional 
role as courts ’ observer, reporter and defender of 
the principle of open justice. If there are fewer 
journalists in court, as recent studies suggest, 20 there 
will be fewer opportunities to challenge applications 
that limit open justice in some way  – for example, 
reporting restrictions or orders to hear proceedings 
in camera. We aim to address the likely decline in 
the media ’ s latter role with our proposals in Part IV. 
However, in order to underscore the significance of 
the media ’ s decreasing involvement in open justice 
and to highlight the importance of, and some of 
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of external oversight might be considered from the 
perspective of principle: while the courts themselves 
are the final arbiters of what open justice requires, 30 
it would be curious if the monitoring of the principle ’ s 
operation were expected to reside entirely in the 
hand of judges themselves  – that is, in the hands of 
those who are held to account by the operation of 
the very same principle. However, putting questions 
of principle aside, evidence of practice alone is 
enough to establish that some method of external 
safeguarding of the principle is required. In both 
England and Australia it has often been claimed that 
courts, particularly lower courts, are in the habit 
of making orders limiting open justice where such 
orders cannot be justified, have insufficient legal 
bases, or are erroneously made on the consent of 
the parties. 31 There is evidence that these complaints 
have merit, 32 and even judges and former judges in 
both Australia and England have expressed the view 
that open justice is, at least on occasion, not always 
observed to the strict requirements of the law. 33 This 
is despite austere warnings from appellate courts that 
open justice is a paramount interest and will only be 
outweighed in rare and exceptional circumstances. 
 The potential for judges to make orders to depart 
from open justice in circumstances where such orders 
are not justified may arise due to a combination 
of three factors. First, judges may have inadequate 
understanding of the law of open justice and the 
limited circumstances that can justify departure from 
the principle. 34 Indeed, this must be a factor, as we 
can only assume that judges will not make orders 
that they know are contrary to the law. Second, 
judges may have a natural tendency to protect 
proceedings and/or participants in proceedings by 
limiting publicity. Although judges are bound to act 
impartially, they are not disinterested participants in 
proceedings: one of their main functions is to navigate 
and protect the fair and proper passage of justice 
through the courts. This may give rise, perhaps quite 
unconsciously, to a tendency to protect proceedings 
by departing from open justice on  ‘ therapeutic, 
prophylactic or prudential grounds ’ 35  – that is, on 
the grounds that orders are  ‘ desirable ’ rather than on 
grounds that meet the strict test of necessity required 
by law. 36 In other words, in a judge ’ s eyes, it might be 
preferable to take the pre-emptive path of allowing 
derogations from open justice than to deal with the 
consequences of, for example, a trial being aborted 
as a result of publicity or for irreparable harm to be 
unnecessarily inflicted upon a participant as a result 
of openness. Third, an application for a reporting 
restriction (or other derogation from open justice) 
may be seen by judges as  ‘ peripheral ’ to the main 
proceedings is dependent upon the receipt by 
the public of information as to what transpired in 
court .  Practically speaking, this information can 
only be obtained from the newspapers or other 
media . 24 
 Of course, the media ’ s capacity to fulfil the objectives 
of the open justice principle by reporting the courts 
is imperfect and, in many respects, limited. 25 For 
example, it is not possible for the media to report 
all judicial proceedings; moreover, decisions about 
what cases will receive coverage and how they will be 
portrayed will be driven largely by the media ’ s own 
editorial and commercial imperatives. 26 While the 
principle of open justice predates the news media, 27 
it is beyond doubt that reporting of the courts by the 
mainstream media has become an integral component 
of the practical operation of an open and transparent 
system of justice. 
 The second but perhaps less commonly 
acknowledged role performed by the media is the 
role of actively  safeguarding the principle of open 
justice. The media do this by vigorously challenging 
attempts to depart from open justice in the courts  – 
for example, by arguing against applications to permit 
proceedings to be heard in private ( ‘ in camera ’ 
orders), that anonymity be granted to participants 
( ‘ anonymity ’ orders), that certain evidence be 
concealed from the public in court ( ‘ concealment 
orders ’ ) or that restrictions be placed on the media ’ s 
reporting of proceedings ( ‘ reporting restrictions ’ 
but also sometimes referred to as  ‘ non-disclosure ’ , 
 ‘ suppression ’ or  ‘ postponement ’ orders). The media 
will often intervene in proceedings to argue that such 
measures cannot be justified according to the law, 
either on the basis that the power to make an order 
does not exist or that a proposed order goes beyond 
what is strictly necessary in the circumstances. 28 
 This external oversight function performed by the 
media has been crucial not only to the development 
of the law of open justice, but also to maintaining 
observance of the principle in practice. Importantly, 
while the courts themselves have a clear responsibility 
to ensure that the dictates of open justice are 
adhered to, supervision by the judiciary alone does 
not provide sufficient defence of the principle. The 
need for external oversight and scrutiny is perhaps 
most clearly expressed in the words of Lord Shaw in 
 Scott v Scott , who warned that there  ‘ is no greater 
danger of usurpation [of the principle] than that 
which proceeds, little by little, under the cover of 
rules of procedure, and at the insistence of judges 
themselves ’ . 29 Indeed, the need for some mechanism 
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intervene in proceedings to make submissions or to 
challenge decisions that limit open justice, particularly 
in relation to reporting restrictions. 44 An informal 
reliance on the media to make such interventions has 
evolved in both the Australian and English contexts 
(as well as in many other common law countries), with 
national media groups in both countries frequently 
pooling resources to mount challenges to proposed 
or granted reporting restrictions. In some Australian 
jurisdictions, in recognition of the media ’ s important 
role in safeguarding open justice, the media have 
statutory standing to appear and be heard on the 
application for a reporting restriction. 45 In Australia 
and England, the media also have various rights of 
review and appeal. 46 Furthermore, in Victoria there 
is a statutory requirement that the media receive 
notice of all applications for reporting restrictions, 47 
the purpose of which is to give the media adequate 
opportunity to exercise their right to appear and be 
heard at the time when the court is considering the 
substantive merits of whether an order should be 
made. 48 In other jurisdictions, legally speaking, notice 
to the media that a reporting restriction has been 
applied for is a matter of discretion for the presiding 
judge and the practice of giving notice differs 
markedly between jurisdictions and courts. 49 
 Unfortunately, the advancement of digital 
communication technologies and associated shifts 
in the media landscape are placing both of the 
aforementioned functions of the media in open justice 
in jeopardy. The fragmentation of mass media and 
the rise of new digital media and advertising entrants 
mean that traditional media  – newspapers, radio and 
television  – are losing audience and hence advertising 
share, resulting in a significant decline in revenue 
streams for commercial outlets. 50 One consequence 
is that the media have far fewer resources to devote 
to reporting the courts, or where resources exist, they 
are diverted elsewhere. 51 Indeed, over the past few 
years, the number of dedicated legal correspondents 
and court reporters in both Australia and England 
and Wales has reduced significantly. 52 This has led to 
an associated decline in the quantity (and arguably 
quality) of court reporting. Until recently, such decline 
was the subject of only anecdotal observation, 53 
including by the Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales at the time, Lord Judge, who expressed concern 
that the apparent absence of journalists in the courts 
posed significant consequences for the continuing 
vitality of open justice. 54 A number of recent small-
scale studies have provided some empirical evidence 
that the quantity of court reporting by the media in 
the United Kingdom (UK) has declined, particularly 
amongst regional outlets. 55 
issues in a proceeding and therefore  ‘ to be disposed 
of as quickly as possible. ’ 37 Thus in the absence of 
an effective contradictor, orders may be made on 
the basis of little evidence, possibly at the consent of 
the parties, and with  ‘ little attention  … given to the 
importance of public transparency ’ . 38 
 Since it cannot (and perhaps should not) fall 
solely on judges to guard the principle of open 
justice, there is an obvious need for a mechanism 
of enforcement and oversight external to both 
judges and the courts themselves to ensure that 
the principle is followed to the fullest extent. It is 
important to note that in criminal matters, it might 
be suggested that prosecuting authorities should 
act to defend the principle of open justice in the 
courts. 39 Ascribing such a role to the prosecution, 
however, is wholly misguided. This is because the 
prosecution will often either take a neutral stance, 40 
or will themselves have an interest in maintaining 
secrecy, particularly in relation to victim identities 
or publicity that may have the possible effect of 
prejudicing proceedings, including future proceedings. 
Consequently, prosecutors may not seek to challenge 
the granting of some orders and in many cases will be 
the applicant themselves. 41 Indeed, in the national 
security and terrorism contexts, it has been accepted 
that prosecuting authorities may be deterred from 
proceeding with prosecutions if there is a risk of secret 
material becoming public during a trial process and 
therefore will only proceed if reporting restrictions 
are in place. 42 While it may be said that all parties, 
prosecutors and defendants alike, have a duty to 
 ‘ preserve ’ open justice as a  ‘ fundamental part of our 
system of justice ’ , 43 the reality is that any apparent 
duty of this kind is significantly tempered by the 
adversarial nature of litigation in common law courts 
where parties predominantly act, through their legal 
representatives, to advance their own interests. 
 In the absence of judges and other participants in 
proceedings providing sufficient oversight, it has 
traditionally been left to the media to play the vital 
role of protecting the principle of open justice. It is 
important to acknowledge, of course, that the media 
do not occupy a formal role in the operation of open 
justice: they can intervene (or not) as they wish based 
on available resources and the level of commercial 
interest in reporting particular proceedings. This 
means that the media ’ s role in protecting open justice, 
like their role in reporting the courts, is both limited 
and imperfect. Nevertheless, the media ’ s informal 
function is recognised by the courts and the law in 
a number of ways. Most significantly, the media are 
generally granted permission upon application to 
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limit the transparency of proceedings. It is important 
to note that due to both the focus of this paper and 
constraints of space we do not comprehensively 
examine each of these challenges; rather, we raise 
them to emphasise the continuing need for an 
external mechanism of oversight, and to demonstrate 
that some developments may make effective external 
oversight, including by the media, more difficult to 
achieve. 
 (i)  Judicial attitudes to open justice 
in response to digital technologies 
 Digital communication technologies have the 
capacity to significantly alter the way court 
information is made available to the public. It is 
therefore unsurprising that judges are now frequently 
faced with difficult questions about how such 
technologies, on the one hand, might facilitate open 
justice and, on the other, how the degree of openness 
that they provide might give rise to new risks to 
the administration of justice and other competing 
interests (such as the privacy of court participants). 
Judicial approaches to, and understandings of, 
new technologies can therefore have significant 
consequences for open justice. 
 In some instances, courts have taken steps to 
embrace new ways of communicating to the public. 
A frequently discussed example is the use of mobile 
devices and social media platforms to report and 
comment on cases  ‘ live ’ from the court. Most courts 
have developed practice rules around the use of such 
forms of electronic communication, 59 and in light of 
the potential benefits of social media coverage of the 
courts for open justice, 60 they have generally adopted 
permissive approaches. 61 Some courts have even 
embraced social media themselves as an avenue of 
direct communication between the courts and the 
public. 62 Another example is the greater capacity 
for and judicial acceptance of the recording and 
webcasting of proceedings. 63 We suggest, however, 
that judicial understandings of new technologies and 
the consequences of material being published online 
can potentially have a negative impact from an open 
justice perspective. A robust mechanism of external 
oversight is therefore essential to ensure that any such 
impact is kept to a minimum. While judicial attitudes 
to digital technologies and their consequences for 
open justice have not been the subject of detailed or 
systematic research, a number of strands of concern 
can be noted. 
 First, judicial concerns about technologically-driven 
changes in media and journalistic practices in 
 Significantly, the declining profitability of the 
mainstream media is also placing their safeguarding 
function in open justice under threat. With fewer 
resources to fund litigation, it seems likely that the 
media will avoid costly challenges to argue against 
attempts to depart from open justice in the courts. 56 
Indeed, there are signs that the media, including 
outlets traditionally very active in defending the 
open justice principle (and media freedom more 
broadly), have become much more selective in their 
approach to litigation across all areas of media law. 57 
In addition, there is a growing range of statutory 
and common law provisions that allow restriction of 
public reporting. As a result, it is likely that a smaller 
proportion of cases with proposed departures from 
open justice, even where clearly beyond the power 
of the court, will be challenged. 58 Although there 
may be other court observers such as academics 
and non-governmental organisations who also have 
an interest in challenging reporting restrictions and 
the like, these observers are unlikely to have the 
necessary legal representation and financial resources 
to mount regular interventions. Consequently, the 
open justice principle is at risk of being left without 
a sufficiently robust external mechanism of oversight 
and enforcement. This is perhaps an unsurprising and 
predictable weakness of a system which has relied on 
the intervention of third parties (ie the media), who 
are under no formal obligation to participate and 
whose motivations may differ from the objectives of 
the open justice principle as conceived by judges over 
the past century. Nevertheless, it raises a question 
that we seek to address in Part IV of this article: 
if the media can ’ t or won ’ t continue to act as the 
institutional defender of open justice, who will ? 
 IIIContemporary challenges 
facing the principle of open 
justice 
 Before turning to consider a number of possible 
solutions to the declining capacity of the media to 
defend open justice in the courts, it is first necessary 
to place the issue in the context of some additional 
contemporary challenges facing the open justice 
principle. In this part we highlight in general terms 
three broad and interrelated categories of challenges: 
changing judicial attitudes to open justice and the 
media in response to new digital technologies; the 
shifting priority given in law to competing interests 
in maintaining secrecy in the courts; and, finally, 
current and future changes to court processes and 
procedures that have the potential to significantly 
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reduce a court ’ s ability to grant effective reporting 
restrictions after evidence has been given. 72 The 
potential for future restrictions to be undermined in 
this way may be seen in some cases as warranting the 
making of  ‘ precautionary ’ and broadly cast restrictions 
on the publication of proceedings. 
 Third, in addition to the possibility of earlier and 
more extensive orders, it may be the case that judges 
will make orders in direct response to new media 
publications, including publication on social media 
by members of the public, in circumstances where 
such orders would not previously have been thought 
necessary. The relatively recent case of  ex parte 
British Broadcasting Corporation provides a pertinent 
example. 73 In that case, a blanket ban on reporting 
any details of a high profile murder case was imposed 
by a trial judge due to concerns about the risk of 
prejudicial commentary that might be published by 
social media users in response to legitimate media 
reports. While this order was ultimately narrowed by 
the UK Court of Appeal and the case was perhaps 
an unusual one (given that the order was made in 
the context of a retrial being granted as a result of 
past prejudicial publicity), it nevertheless indicates 
that changing communication technologies have the 
potential to have a restrictive influence on decisions 
regarding open justice.  R v Sarker 74 provides another 
recent example where a trial judge imposed a blanket 
reporting restriction due to judicial assumptions 
about potential internet publication. In that case, 
a reporting restriction was granted out of concern 
that contemporaneous online reports of the trial 
would include links to previous stories containing 
prejudicial information about the accused and that 
such prejudicial information would therefore become 
readily accessible to jurors. 75 While the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was successful in 
having this order quashed by the Court of Appeal, 
this occurred more than four months after the trial, by 
which time media interest in reporting the trial had 
substantially waned. 
 It is important to note as an aside that many of 
the concerns just described may also arise in the 
context of decisions by judges to provide access to 
court documents. It has been recognised that access 
to court documents and exhibits is integral to the 
operation of open justice 76 and therefore access will 
usually be permitted where documents have been 
deployed in court. Statutes and rules of court often 
provide rights of access to certain documents; 77 
however, access will sometimes require leave of 
the court 78 and decisions whether to grant access 
appear to be treated as much more discretionary than 
reporting the courts may encourage the greater use of 
reporting restrictions. For example, one concern that 
has been expressed by judges is that the decline in 
available media resources to employ dedicated court 
reporters means that journalists who are responsible 
for reporting the courts may be less familiar with legal 
restraints on reporting evidence heard during  voir dire 
or the variety of automatic statutory restrictions that 
may apply. As a consequence, it has been suggested 
that judges may grant reporting restrictions as 
precautionary measures to reinforce existing statutory 
bans on publication. 64 Another concern is that judges 
may sometimes see a need to restrain the reporting 
of cases in order to  ‘ mitigate the prejudicial impact ’ 
of potentially inaccurate and unbalanced media 
reporting. 65 This concern is likely to be amplified 
by the publication of reports in the digital sphere, 
where it has been claimed that coverage is often 
less comprehensive, accurate and balanced than 
in traditional media formats due the ways in which 
news is published online. 66 This concern is also likely 
to be amplified by the prospect of non-professional 
members of the public reporting the courts via new 
media platforms, whether as  ‘ citizen journalists ’ 
or interested by-standers. This is because judges 
may be concerned that citizen journalists are not 
subject to the same editorial and ethical standards of 
accuracy and fairness that apply to traditional media 
journalists, 67 and that such reporting is likely to adopt 
less balanced forms of expression. 68 
 Second, the prospect of online publicity of cases, 
and the difficulties of removing material once 
published online, may lead to a judicial tendency 
to prevent such publication by imposing earlier and 
more extensive reporting restrictions. For example, 
the risk that legitimate reports of the preliminary 
stages of a proceeding will be republished or come 
to prominence at the time of a trial, and therefore 
prejudice the jury, may prompt judges to impose 
reporting restrictions when the matter first comes to 
court. 69 Alternatively, it is possible that the ease with 
which reporting restrictions can be undermined by the 
publication of material online, particularly on social 
media 70 and sometimes anonymously or from outside 
the jurisdiction, 71 may have the effect of encouraging 
the use of more extreme incursions into open justice 
in order to ensure that information remains contained 
within the court, such as through the issuing of in 
camera orders or by requiring the concealment 
of information from the public in court. Another 
apparent concern may be that the  ‘ extensive reach 
and immediacy ’ of publishing in  ‘ real time ’ from the 
court via social media removes the  ‘ space ’ between 
courtroom events and publication and therefore may 
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closure of the court, but also a hearing where one 
or more parties are absent, as well as the possibility 
of the court rendering a partly closed judgment 
(a judgment which, at least in part, is not disclosed 
to one or more parties or to the public). 84 CMPs 
were originally permitted in limited categories 
of proceedings, but they can now be used in a 
significantly wider range of civil cases following the 
introduction of the Justice and Security Act 2013 (UK) 
and in certain judicial review proceedings following 
the UK Supreme Court ’ s recent decision in  R (on 
the application of Haralambous) v Crown Court at 
St Albans . 85 Furthermore, even more ambiguous 
and underexplored in the case law and academic 
literature are the developing mechanisms in England 
for closing the courts to the public and the media 
on the basis of  ‘ ministerial certificates ’ in national 
security cases. 86 This new breed of in camera 
order, based on the arguably distinct public interest 
immunity (PII) procedure, has caused concern on 
both Article 6 and Article 10 ECHR grounds. 
 Privacy  – perhaps to a greater extent than national 
security  – has also emerged as an increasingly relevant 
countervailing interest in England and Wales. 87 
Historically, privacy  per se did not provide a sufficient 
ground for limiting open justice. 88 It was only where 
the publication of private facts would destroy the 
subject matter of confidential information or trade 
secret cases, or where publication would otherwise 
interfere with the administration of justice, could 
the court adopt measures to prevent publicity. This 
remains the case in Australia, although some statutory 
grounds clearly have their underlying interest in 
privacy. 89 However, in the UK, unlike in Australia, 
privacy has emerged as a relatively strongly protected 
legal interest as a result of the  ‘ incorporation ’ of 
the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR 
into domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK). This, combined with the possibility of new 
communication technologies that enhance the 
dissemination of and access to private information, 
has meant that privacy concerns over the public 
availability of court information now have greater 
prominence. From a legal perspective, these concerns 
must be balanced, essentially on a case by case 
basis, against competing interests in open justice and 
transparency as elements of freedom of speech. 90 
Heightened regulation of data protection under the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) could 
also affect the handling of courts ’ data; for example, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
has announced that it will no longer publish names 
of natural persons in requests for preliminary 
rulings. 91 
decisions to grant orders departing from open justice, 
such as in camera orders and reporting restrictions. 79 
It is in the exercise of such discretion that the relative 
permanency and universal accessibility of documents, 
if published online, may weigh heavily in judicial 
considerations about access. This is particularly the 
case given the possibility of publication occurring via 
social media by individuals and entities not subject 
to the publishing standards of traditional media. As 
with reporting restrictions, judicial perspectives about 
developments in media and journalistic practices may 
also be relevant, which may result in judges being 
concerned that documents and exhibits, particularly 
audio-visual exhibits, may not be presented in a fair 
and accurate manner. 80 Finally, the prospect of court 
documents being published online may raise concerns 
about privacy, which, for a judge, may significantly 
militate against a decision to grant access. 81 In the 
following section, we discuss in further detail the 
emergence of privacy as a relevant consideration in 
decisions regarding open justice. 
 (ii)Greater balancing of competing 
interests ? 
 Alongside possible changes to judicial approaches 
to open justice, the balance that must be struck as a 
matter of law between the need for transparency (and 
the benefits that it entails) and various countervailing 
considerations has also changed in recent years 
and is likely to continue to do so. These changes, 
like the potential impact of digital technologies on 
judicial attitudes to open justice, mean that effective 
mechanisms for putting forward arguments regarding 
the public interest in open justice in the courts 
is critical. The danger is that without an effective 
advocate, the correct balance will not be struck in 
individual cases  – especially in lower courts  – or that, 
in the words of Lord Woolf MR, the categories or 
circumstances where exceptions are applied will, little 
by little,  ‘ grow by accretion ’ . 82 
 The public interest in national security provides one 
example. While concerns over national security have 
always provided sufficient justification for departing 
from open justice, the  ‘ growing volume ’ of cases 
involving national security, 83 along with new legal 
mechanisms for controlling the disclosure of sensitive 
national security information in the courts, means 
that such concerns now pose a greater threat to 
open justice than they did in the past. In England 
and Wales, for example, concerns have centred 
around the use of controversial  ‘ closed material 
procedures ’ (CMPs) in national security cases in the 
civil courts. Such procedures involve not only the 
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reflected such  ‘ minimalist ’ understanding. However, 
a more modern, proactive and meaningful approach 
to open justice requires that courts adopt practices 
and procedures that seek to enhance as far as possible 
public access to information about proceedings before 
the courts, including through the use of technology. 97 
 Certain aspects of court practice and procedure 
have long been considered problematic from an 
open justice perspective. A complaint frequently 
raised by journalists in both Australia and the UK 
relates to access to court documents and exhibits. 98 
Whilst the courts recognise the importance of access 
to such material to the operation of open justice, 99 
and statutes and rules of court often provide rights 
of access, 100 the reality is that gaining access to 
court documents is often fraught with practical 
difficulties. 101 In England and Wales, for example, 
access to documents requires a physical visit to the 
court; 102 furthermore, in many cases, documents 
can only be accessed in hard copy, and access and 
copying fees as well as delays in obtaining access can 
be prohibitive. Other complaints include unreliable 
and inconsistent access to daily court lists 103 and 
information about court orders, 104 particularly active 
reporting restrictions. 105 
 Digital communication technologies, of course, can 
be used to enhance court practices and procedures in 
order to remedy many of the access issues that have 
just been mentioned. For example, the introduction 
of online databases of reporting restrictions and, 
notwithstanding significant privacy implications, 106 
the automatic availability of digitised and searchable 
court documents, have received particular attention 
as mechanisms for enhancing open justice. 107 Indeed, 
access to documents is often crucial to the proper and 
complete understanding of proceedings due to the 
increasing use of written rather than oral submissions 
in court. 108 There is therefore a convincing argument 
that all documents used in court should automatically 
be made publicly available in electronic form, and 
that any departure from such automatic availability 
should require a court order in a manner consistent 
with other departures from open justice. What is 
less often acknowledged, however, is the potential 
for technology-based changes to court practices and 
procedures to have the converse effect of  limiting 
court transparency and openness. 109 As we shall see, 
unless appropriate mechanisms are adopted, such 
changes have the capacity to significantly reduce 
public access to court proceedings. This, in turn, raises 
questions about how, if at all, external mechanisms of 
oversight can continue to safeguard the public interest 
in open justice. 
 There are two types of cases affected by privacy 
concerns in the English courts. The first is where 
the proceedings have been brought to protect 
privacy, such as cases involving the tort of misuse 
of private information, or where there are alleged 
breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) or the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK). In such 
cases, anonymity orders or reporting restrictions are 
sometimes ordered  – especially where an injunction 
has been sought  – to protect the privacy interests 
being litigated. 92 This is because allowing publication 
of the private information or the identity of the 
applicant will undermine the administration of justice 
by disclosing the very information that the claimant 
has sought, through the litigation, to prevent from 
being published. From an open justice perspective, 
the concern in this type of case is to ensure that no 
more information is suppressed than is necessary to 
protect the privacy interests at stake. The second, 
more difficult category of case is where a privacy right 
is not the cause of action, but private information 
is nevertheless disclosed during the course of 
proceedings. In this type of case, if an application 
for anonymity or a reporting restriction is made, 93 
a court will be required to strike an appropriate 
balance between open justice and the protection 
of privacy. While the common law had already 
expanded to a limited degree to provide greater 
protection of privacy-related interests in this context, 94 
there is no doubt that an order resulting from the 
balancing of rights under the ECHR may be imposed 
in circumstances that go beyond the common law 
categories of cases where derogations from open 
justice have traditionally been permitted. 95 Having 
said that, the UK Supreme Court has consistently 
held that the importance of open justice (and the 
inherent public interest in court information) means 
that freedom of speech and the media ’ s right to 
report the courts will only be trumped by the right to 
privacy in  ‘ rare ’ cases. 96 The concern, nevertheless, 
is that without an effective contradictor acting in the 
interests of open justice, the decisions and conduct of 
the lower courts may not consistently reflect the high 
threshold test that is required to be applied by law. 
 (iii)Technology driven shifts in 
practice and procedure 
 Finally, approaches to court practice and procedure 
can have significant implications for the operation of 
open justice. A conservative and passive interpretation 
of open justice would mean that courts have no 
greater obligation than to simply open their doors 
to allow public observation and reporting  – and, at 
least historically, judicial statements have perhaps 
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by ODR in a service called eCourtroom, including the 
giving of directions and the determination of  ex parte 
applications for substituted service in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 118 In another example, an ODR 
tribunal called the Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) 
commenced in 2015 in the Canadian province of 
British Columbia, 119 and is now the mandatory forum 
for the adjudication of all small claims and strata title 
disputes. 120 
 The use of ODR systems to exercise judicial power 
raises significant challenges for open justice. 121 The 
primary concern is that if there is no  ‘ hearing ’ in a 
physical or virtual place, this effectively eliminates 
a core feature of open justice: the right to attend 
and observe judicial proceedings. Importantly, this 
may be contrary to constitutional requirements and 
international and regional human rights instruments. 
For example, in Australia, a court exercising judicial 
power in a way that departs from a core feature of 
open justice may be in violation of Chapter III of 
the  Australian Constitution ; 122 under the ICCPR and 
the ECHR, on the other hand, litigants are entitled 
to a  ‘ fair and public  hearing ’ . 123 In lieu of a public 
hearing in the traditional sense, it may be that the 
requirements of open justice will be met if all of 
the electronic messages between the court and the 
parties are made available to the public, along with 
all relevant documentation, court orders and reasons 
for decision. 124 As it currently stands, the degree to 
which existing systems cater to open justice varies. 
In the Federal Court ’ s eCourtroom, a transcript of 
the exchange of electronic messages between the 
judicial officer and the parties is available but only 
upon request. Court orders and documents, on the 
other hand, are subject to the usual rules and avenues 
of access. In the CRT in British Columbia, only 
orders and decisions are published on the tribunal ’ s 
website, but members of the public may  ‘ request 
copies of submissions and evidence provided during 
the tribunal ’ s decision process ’ . 125 However, it does 
not appear that it is possible to obtain a copy of the 
messages sent between tribunal members and the 
parties to a dispute. 
 A separate issue  – and one which is particularly 
relevant to the present paper  – is how external 
mechanisms of oversight of open justice might operate 
in ODR systems. While imperfect as an accountability 
mechanism, one of the benefits of a physical hearing 
is that it will be obvious to those present in court, 
including the media, that an application has been 
made to close the court or that certain information 
has been or is about to be withheld in some manner. 
Where this occurs, the media have traditionally 
 One example is the use of algorithmic automation 
and big data to assist in judicial decision-making. 
While the widespread adoption of  ‘ robotised justice ’ 
in deciding cases might be some way off, it is certainly 
not unprecedented. 110 As Sharon Rodrick points 
out, the use of such technology by judges will pose 
a threat to open justice and transparency unless the 
algorithms and programs used to make automated 
decisions are made public. 111 However, perhaps the 
most notable example of the impact of technology on 
court practice and procedure is the shift or potential 
shift to the use of  ‘ virtual courts ’ . The term  ‘ virtual 
court ’ or  ‘ virtual courtroom ’ can be used in a number 
of different senses. 112 It can mean simply the use of 
technology within a traditional, physical courtroom  – 
such as participants appearing by way of audio-
visual link. The use of such technology is now fairly 
common in courtrooms across Australia and the UK 
and is not especially problematic from an open justice 
perspective, provided the public in court have access 
to the video-link via audio-visual screens located in 
the courtroom. However, the term can also be used 
to describe a  ‘ distributed courtroom ’  – that is a  ‘ virtual 
space ’ where participants who are physically located 
in different places  ‘ meet ’ to conduct proceedings. This 
method has been used in at least one English tribunal 
hearing, with all parties participating remotely, 
with only the judge and journalists in the tribunal 
hearing centre. 113 As noted by Sharon Rodrick, 
unless  ‘ the public are permitted to be present in 
some capacity ’ , distributed virtual courts pose  ‘ some 
serious challenges for the principle of open justice. ’ 114 
Such a presence might be physical  – for example, by 
admitting the public to the physical space occupied 
by the trier of fact  – or it might be virtual by enabling 
the public to stream virtual proceedings, or view from 
a specified location. 115 
 More problematic from an open justice perspective, 
however, is the emerging use, or proposed use, of 
online dispute resolution (ODR) systems. Such systems 
are similar to, but distinct from, distributed virtual 
courts. 116 Unlike virtual courts, ODR systems do not 
necessarily involve any form of  ‘ hearing ’ , virtual or 
otherwise; instead, disputes are resolved by a series of 
electronic communications or exchanges conducted 
entirely online but without the parties  ‘ meeting ’ . At 
present, ODR systems are largely confined to the 
private resolution of high-volume, low-value disputes 
arising out of the use of online services, such as PayPal 
and eBay. 117 However, due to the push to modernise 
court systems, ODR is increasingly being used as the 
vehicle for the exercise of state-sanctioned judicial 
power. For example, since 2004, the Federal Court of 
Australia has conducted a range of minor applications 
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that  ‘ justice, and a criminal conviction, will be served 
not just behind closed courtroom doors but behind 
closed bedroom doors, without any public scrutiny or 
independent judicial oversight at all ’ . 131 
 IVNew mechanisms for 
safeguarding the principle 
of open justice ? 
 The declining role of the media in protecting open 
justice raises the question of how the principle will be 
safeguarded into the future. We are in no doubt that 
the principle warrants some degree of independent 
institutional oversight. Indeed, if we accept that open 
justice is a principle of fundamental importance to the 
proper exercise of judicial power and the operation 
of the rule of law, and that it cannot be left solely to 
judges themselves to guarantee its full observance, 
then we must accept the need for some form of 
external oversight and accountability. Furthermore, as 
we have seen, such a mechanism is essential given the 
range of contemporary challenges that are imposing, 
or have the potential to impose, increasing pressure 
on the law and practice of the open justice principle. 
Thus, if we can no longer rely upon the media to 
perform such an overseer role (if ever we could), 
we believe that the state should adopt appropriate 
measures to fill the void. In this section, we examine 
several possible external oversight mechanisms that 
may be adopted to help ensure (or at least promote) 
compliance with the stringent requirements of the 
open justice principle. 
 (i)  Improving advocacy: the 
introduction of an open justice 
advocate 
 The first  – and most interventionist  – mechanism that 
we explore is the establishment of an independent, 
state-appointed open justice advocate (OJA) to 
appear and make representations in cases where a 
court is considering an application to depart from 
open justice. 132 Under this initiative, it is envisaged 
that courts would be subject to a statutory obligation 
to notify the OJA each time a court is considering 
whether to make a discretionary in camera, 
anonymity or concealment order, or to issue a 
reporting restriction. 133 The OJA would then have 
statutory rights to intervene in such proceedings, to 
apply to have orders reviewed at any time during 
proceedings, and a right to appeal any decision made 
by a judge which impacts on open justice. To assist 
the advocate in fulfilling this role, he or she would 
been in a position to then make a decision about 
whether to intervene in order to defend the 
operation of the open justice principle. In ODR 
systems, such transparency about transparency 
cannot be guaranteed in the same way, because 
there is no physical hearing. Instead, transparency 
must be built into the system in some manner  – for 
example, with messages between the parties and 
the court and all documents being made accessible 
to the public automatically and in real time, so that 
any request to depart from open justice is clearly 
visible. Furthermore, there must be the capacity in 
such systems for interested third parties, including 
the media, to intervene to challenge departures, or 
proposed departures, from open justice. At present, it 
does not appear that the Federal Court ’ s eCourtroom 
or the CRT in British Columbia are designed to 
facilitate such third party intervention. 126 
 The introduction of online processes for both civil and 
criminal justice are currently being piloted and further 
considered in England and Wales. The HM Courts  & 
Tribunals Service is currently engaged in a large-scale 
reform program which includes the introduction 
of new digitised processes for court disputes and 
hearings. In 2015, the Civil Justice Council ’ s (CJC) 
Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group issued a 
report containing proposals for ODR for low value 
civil claims in England and Wales. 127 The now 
abandoned Prisons and Courts Bill 2016–17, 128 which 
sought to implement some of the recommendations 
in the CJC ’ s report, contained provisions for certain 
civil, family and criminal law matters to be dealt with 
using online methods. 129 At the time, some mention 
was made of the issues associated with public access  – 
for example, initial proposals for in-court video and 
audio terminals were made in discussions about the 
Bill. However, in general, as Townend has argued, 130 
mechanisms for public access to courts have generally 
been overlooked in public discussions of the proposals 
and have not subject to adequate public consultation. 
For example, the Ministry of Justice has not provided 
meaningful detail on how any ODR procedure for 
low-level civil claims would be publicly accessed, 
despite public assurances by its judicial and academic 
supporters that provisions for open justice would be 
improved by new systems. Nor have sufficient details 
been provided about how the observance of the open 
justice principle would be monitored in such systems. 
These details, however, are critical if such initiatives 
are to facilitate the exercise of state-sanctioned 
judicial power in a manner that is both transparent 
and accountable. With regard to proposals for an 
online plea and conviction system for minor criminal 
offences, such as rail fare evasion, there is the risk 
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time when the substantive merits of an order are 
being considered is a significant shortcoming of the 
Vincent Review model, because such requests are 
likely to be rare. This is evidenced by the low uptake 
of a similar regime that was recently in operation 
in Victoria. In 2016, in response to concerns that 
the OC Act had not had the intended effect of 
reducing the number of reporting restrictions being 
issued by Victorian courts, the then Chief Justice, the 
Honourable Marilyn Warren, initiated an agreement 
with the Victorian Bar to pilot an  ‘ Open Courts Act 
Duty Barrister Scheme ’ . Under the scheme, duty 
barristers would appear on a pro bono basis to 
assist the court in applications under the OC Act 
if requested by the presiding judge. 142 While the 
pilot scheme operated only in the Supreme Court 
of Victoria, there were very few judicial referrals for 
pro bono assistance. 143 This was despite a significant 
number of reporting restrictions being made by the 
Supreme Court while the Scheme was in operation. 144 
One explanation for the low uptake may be that 
Supreme Court judges were not sufficiently aware 
of the scheme or it might point, as we suspect is 
the case, to a more fundamental judicial reluctance 
to seek assistance in circumstances where it is 
optional. 145 Whatever the reason, we are nonetheless 
of the view that making the intervention of an open 
justice advocate dependent on a request from a 
judge undermines the advocate ’ s role, at least as 
we conceive it, as an independent guardian of the 
principle of open justice. 
 If we accept the need for a model where an OJA is 
empowered to intervene in proceedings based on 
his or her independent discretion, there are two 
broad issues that we must subsequently examine. 
First, what precise interests should the OJA represent ? 
Should the advocate always fervently advocate in 
favour of open justice ? Or should it have a broader 
or more flexible remit to advance other interests in 
open justice disputes, such as privacy, reputation, 
or national security ? We are firmly of the view that 
the OJA ’ s role should be confined to the former. 146 
Decisions about open justice are made by judges in 
an adversarial context where each party puts forward 
competing arguments representing different interests 
and, at least in theory, it is through such a process 
that the judge arrives at the  ‘ correct ’ decision. 
Therefore, it makes sense in an adversarial system 
for the OJA to appear in court  solely to advocate 
the public ’ s interest in open justice: the applicant 
will have the burden of proving that the relevant 
exception to open justice meets the necessity test and 
the OJA will put forward contradicting arguments as 
to why it does not. However, it is important to note 
have statutory rights to inspect and copy all court 
documents relevant to the advocate ’ s activities. 134 
 The introduction of a version of this model was 
recently recommended in Victoria. 135 This was in 
the context of a review of the operation of the Open 
Courts Act 2013 (Vic) ( ‘ OC Act ’ ) conducted by the 
Honourable Frank Vincent, a retired Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria (Vincent Review). 136 The 
recommendation was made not only in response to 
the decline in media interventions in open justice 
cases in Australia, but also because, according to 
the Vincent Review, it is not and never has been 
the media ’ s formal  ‘ responsibility to monitor the 
system or to ensure that orders [departing from open 
justice] are properly made ’ . 137 Furthermore, it was 
acknowledged in the Vincent Review that it cannot 
be expected that the parties themselves will provide 
adequate protection of the open justice principle. This 
is because, as we suggested earlier, the parties  ‘ may 
be indifferent ’ to whether an order is made in any 
given case or may, as is to be expected,  ‘ prefer that 
exposure of the full details of the case and their role 
and conduct does not occur. ’ 138 Under the model 
proposed in the Vincent Review, an existing statutory 
officer in Victoria, the public interest monitor ( ‘ PIM ’ ), 
would be given powers in relation to orders made 
under the OC Act, the legislation which governs the 
making of in camera orders and reporting restrictions 
( ‘ suppression orders ’ ) in Victoria. The PIM currently 
has statutory powers to represent the public interest 
in a variety of court hearings, including applications 
for surveillance and covert search warrants, and 
preventative detention orders. 139 Under the proposal, 
the PIM would be empowered, where it is in the 
public interest to do so, to seek the review of an order 
by the judge who made the order or to initiate an 
appeal of the making of an order to a higher court. 140 
However, in contrast to the model set out in the 
introduction to this section, these powers could not 
be exercised on the PIM ’ s own initiative; rather, they 
could only be exercised at the request of an affected 
party. The Vincent Review also recommended that 
the PIM be empowered to  ‘ appear as a contradictor, 
make submissions and ask questions when a judge 
is determining whether ’ an order under the OC Act 
should be made and on what terms. 141 However, 
again, under the proposal the PIM would not be 
empowered to appear on his or her own initiative; the 
appearance of the PIM would only be permitted at 
the request of the judge considering whether to make 
an order under the OC Act. 
 The need for a judge to request the assistance of the 
PIM before he or she could appear in court at the 
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 To ensure that the giving of notice is effective in aiding 
the OJA ’ s decision about whether to intervene and on 
what grounds, the statutory requirement for notice 
should mandate that certain information is contained 
in the notice provided to the OJA. First, the notice 
should contain a draft of the proposed order. This 
will assist the OJA in assessing whether the terms of 
the order that is sought are appropriate and do not 
extend further than is necessary in the circumstances, 
whether in terms of scope or duration. Second, the 
notice should set out the legal basis of the order  – for 
example, whether it is sought pursuant to statute or 
common law  – and the grounds (ie to protect the 
administration of justice, prevent the victim of a 
sexual offence from embarrassment, national security, 
etc). Third, where the ground of the order is to protect 
the administration of justice, the notice should also 
contain a statement of the order ’ s proposed purpose 
(ie to prevent prejudice to a jury, to prevent the 
subject matter of the litigation from being disclosed). 
Fourth, the notice should include a summary of the 
arguments intended to be advanced in support of the 
order and a summary of the evidence intended to be 
relied upon. Where affidavits are available at the time 
of the giving of notice, they should be annexed to 
the notice. Similarly, where an order is made without 
notice it should state the legal basis upon which it was 
made, the ground or grounds and purpose, and be 
accompanied by both a statement of reasons and any 
affidavit evidence relied upon. 
 Finally, we envisage that the main argument against 
the establishment of an OJA would be the cost. 
However, we suggest that the importance of open 
justice to the rule of law and as the main mechanism, 
apart from the giving of reasons and the appeals 
process, by which the judicial branch of government 
is held to account would more than warrant incurring 
the expense. Furthermore, the cost of an OJA is 
likely to be a fraction of what is currently spent out 
of the public purse holding the other branches of 
government to account via avenues such as the 
judicial review of administrative decisions and 
constitutional challenges to legislative action in the 
courts, particularly in Australia. 
 (ii)Enhancing decision-making: 
statutory obligation to give public 
reasons 
 In addition to recommending the introduction of an 
OJA (of sorts), the Vincent Review recommended 
that judges be subject to a statutory obligation to 
provide a written statement of reasons whenever 
that not every application for an order departing 
from open justice would require the intervention 
of the OJA. In some cases, perhaps in most, it will 
be clear that an order should be made because the 
circumstances clearly fall within one or more of the 
accepted categories of cases where open justice 
can be limited in some way, and that the order is 
both necessary and, as drafted, goes no further than 
the circumstances require. Where this is the case, 
the OJA may elect to wait until the order is made 
and, if it appears to be incorrectly made or if the 
terms of the order impose a greater incursion upon 
open justice than is considered necessary in the 
circumstances, he or she may at that point intervene 
to either have the order reviewed or revoked, or to 
appeal it to a higher court. 
 Second, would the intervention of the OJA be 
workable in practice ? The main issue in terms of 
procedure is the difficulty that intervention of the 
OJA might create for case management, given that 
hearings may need to be adjourned or relisted at 
short notice in order to facilitate the appearance of 
the OJA. This may be particularly problematic in the 
lower courts, where the caseload is high. However, 
such difficulties can be avoided in many cases if 
the OJA has adequate notice that an order is to be 
applied for and is, in turn, able to give adequate 
notice to the court of their intention to intervene. As 
noted above, a notice regime operates in Victoria 
under the OC Act, which requires that an applicant 
for a reporting restriction provide three days ’ notice 
to the court of their intention to apply; the court is 
then required to notify all media organisations to 
enable them to appear, if they wish to do so, when 
the application is considered by the court. If such a 
regime can operate to enable media intervention, 
there is no reason why it could not also operate to 
enable the appearance of the OJA. Of course, there 
will be some cases where it is unavoidable that an 
application for a reporting restriction (or some other 
derogation from open justice) has to be made on short 
notice or even without notice. In such cases, with 
the exception of applications for in camera orders 
where the effect of such an order is both immediate 
and irreversible, it is possible that a court could make 
an anonymity order or a reporting restriction on an 
interim basis without notice and continue to hear the 
substantive proceedings. 147 The court would then give 
notice to the OJA (and the media) to enable them to 
appear at a later hearing where the court considers 
the substantive merits of the application. The latter 
procedure may also be applied where a court makes 
an order on its own motion. 
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it is said to foster  ‘ good decision making ’ by judges. 
As stated by Meagher JA in  Beale v Government 
Insurance Office (NSW) ,  ‘ [t]he requirement to 
provide reasons can operate prophylactically on 
the judicial mind, guarding against the birth of an 
unconsidered or impulsive decision ’ . 155 In theory at 
least, the discipline applied in the process of reducing 
reason to writing causes judges to  ‘ reason more 
systematically and thoroughly through the relevant 
facts, law and application of the law to those facts ’ 156 
It was primarily for the disciplining effect that the 
Vincent Review recommended the introduction of a 
statutory obligation to prepare and publish reasons. 
Thus, having found that judges and magistrates had 
often demonstrated  ‘ limited understanding of the 
requirements of the OC Act ’ , it was thought that an 
obligation to provide written reasons would impose 
an  ‘ additional level of discipline ’ by compelling judges 
to rigorously assess whether an order to depart from 
open justice is necessary according to the law. 157 It 
is important to note that an obligation to provide 
reasons as a means of ensuring compliance with the 
law will be particularly desirable where an order is 
applied for in the absence of an effective contradictor, 
or where the order is made by the court on its own 
motion. 
 (iii)Enhancing transparency: public 
register and reporting obligations 
 The introduction of an OJA and a requirement to 
provide reasons are initiatives that are intended 
to ensure that the law of open justice is rigorously 
applied by having a direct influence on the decision-
making processes of judges. Mechanisms which 
increase public transparency regarding the state of 
open justice, both at the level of individual decisions 
and more broadly, might also be adopted. While 
such mechanisms may not have a direct effect 
on improving judicial decision-making, they are 
nevertheless important to enabling general public 
oversight of the operation of the open justice 
principle. We have already mentioned that the 
provision of written reasons significantly enhances the 
transparency of decision-making. In this final section 
we canvass two further options: (1) a public register of 
all orders that have an impact upon open justice; and 
(2) open justice reporting obligations. 
 (a)Public register 
 Publicly accessible registers of reporting restrictions 
are in operation, or have been proposed, in a number 
of jurisdictions. For example, a publicly accessible 
a reporting restriction is granted. 148 The Vincent 
Review also recommended that such reasons should 
be made available to the public, unless restrictions or 
redactions are required to ensure that an order is not 
undermined. We are of the view that the statutory 
obligation to provide public reasons, were it to be 
introduced, should apply to all decisions that have the 
effect of limiting open justice. 
 Under the common law there is an existing obligation 
on judges to provide reasons for all decisions other 
than minor interlocutory and procedural decisions. 149 
Furthermore, in both England and Wales and 
Australia, an emerging view expressed by the courts 
is that such reasons must be made available to the 
public. 150 Given the significance of the open justice 
principle and given that the categories of cases where 
reasons are not required have been  ‘ progressively 
decreasing ’ , 151 we are certain that any decision to 
depart from open justice will attract the obligation to 
provide reasons for that decision. 152 Despite this, it 
appears that the courts  – particularly lower courts  – 
do not routinely provide publicly available statements 
of reasons when they make orders to depart from 
open justice. Thus, placing the obligation on a 
statutory footing would ensure that judges are aware 
of the obligation. Such judicial awareness would, in 
turn, ensure that the obligation is more frequently 
observed. 
 The provision of public reasons in the context of 
decisions regarding open justice would have two 
expected benefits. First, it would enhance external 
oversight of the operation of open justice, by 
increasing public knowledge of the extent to which 
open justice is limited in the courts, and by providing 
details of the circumstances where it is done and 
the reasons that have been relied upon for doing so. 
This, of course, reflects the fact that the provision of 
public reasons more generally is one of the main ways 
that the decision-making of judges and the reasoning 
processes that they adopt are held up to professional 
and public scrutiny. 153 Furthermore, the critical role 
that reasons play in ensuring transparency of judicial 
decision-making, including in relation to decisions 
regarding open justice, suggests that the giving of 
reasons might even be considered  ‘ part and parcel ’ of 
the principle of open justice itself. 154 
 Second, and perhaps more crucially for our purposes, 
the expectation is that the giving of public reasons 
would improve the quality of decision-making 
regarding open justice. One of the key rationales for 
the general requirement to provide reasons is that 
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the Vincent Review, a public register of reporting 
restrictions would also be valuable as a mechanism for 
monitoring the granting of reporting restrictions more 
generally. It would do this by providing  ‘ a mechanism 
for public scrutiny of our process of justice, as 
demanded by the principle of open justice. ’ 164 If 
a register of reporting restrictions were introduced 
with the purpose of informing the public about the 
operation of open justice in the courts, then there 
would be a good case for extending it to also include 
in camera, anonymity and concealment orders. This 
would ensure that the register provides a complete 
account of the state of open justice in the courts. 
 (b)Reporting requirements 
 Finally, a further mechanism for increasing 
transparency regarding the making of orders to depart 
from open justice is through the adoption of annual 
reporting requirements. 
 In South Australia, section 71 of the Evidence 
Act 1929 (SA) requires that the Attorney-General 
of South Australia table in the South Australian 
Parliament an annual report on the number of 
reporting restrictions made by all South Australian 
courts, along with a summary of the reasons that were 
given for their making. It is worth noting that reports 
tabled by the Attorney-General since 2011 do not 
sufficiently comply with the latter requirement: the 
reports simply repeat in list form the available legal 
grounds for the making of reporting restrictions under 
section 69A of the Evidence Act, without indicating 
how often such legal grounds were relied upon or 
providing further details regarding the reasons for the 
orders that were granted. 165 This, of course, renders 
the reports effectively meaningless in relation to the 
reasons for the orders. 
 While compliance with the letter and most 
certainly the spirit of the reporting requirements 
in South Australia is clearly lacking, the imposition 
of mandatory annual reporting is nevertheless a 
potentially useful way of providing valuable insights 
into the operation of open justice. We suggest that 
reporting requirements, like the introduction of a 
public register of orders, should include all types of 
derogations from open justice  – in camera, anonymity, 
and concealment orders, along with reporting 
restrictions. Furthermore, the reporting requirements, 
in order to provide a comprehensive account of 
when, how and why courts have departed from open 
justice, should require reporting of details beyond 
the number of orders and their reasons. Such details 
should include: the legal basis of orders, the scope 
online list of all cases where reporting restrictions have 
been made pursuant to sections 4(2) and 11 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK) and section 46(1) 
of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 
1937 by Scottish courts has long been in operation 
in Scotland. 158 Each entry in the list contains only 
basic information  – case name, court, location, and 
date of the order  – and not the terms of the orders 
themselves. The Law Commission of England and 
Wales in its recent inquiry into contempt of court 
recommended the adoption of a similar online list 
of all reporting restriction made under the Contempt 
of Court Act by courts in England and Wales. 159 
It was recommended that in addition to the basic 
information referred to above, the list should also 
contain details about when orders expire, and that 
access to the precise terms of orders should be 
available to authorised publishers via a restricted 
access online database. 
 In Australia, public registers of reporting restrictions 
are available for public access in two states. In 
Tasmania, the Supreme Court of Tasmania maintains 
an online list of all cases where reporting restrictions 
have been issued and, where appropriate, also 
provides signed copies of orders for download. 160 
In South Australia, there is a statutory requirement 
that the Registrar maintain a register of all reporting 
restrictions and that the register be open for 
inspection by members of the public during ordinary 
office hours. 161 However, the register is not available 
online and can only be accessed by a physical 
visit to the court administration building. Similarly, 
the Vincent Review in Victoria recommended the 
establishment of a  ‘ central, publicly accessible register 
of suppression orders made by all Victorian courts 
and tribunals ’ . 162 The register would contain  ‘ details 
of the terms and duration ’ of orders, along with, to 
the extent reasonably possible, written statements 
of reasons. However, it is unclear from the Vincent 
Review recommendations whether the register would 
be accessible online or exist only in physical form in 
the court registry. 
 The primary purpose of a public register of reporting 
restrictions, as proposed by the Law Commission of 
England and Wales and the Vincent Review, would 
be to assist with enforcement by ensuring that the 
media and other publishers are able to readily obtain 
information regarding the existence of orders and 
the information that those orders prohibit from being 
published. 163 This would address the persistent 
concerns of publishers regarding access to orders and 
would solve some of the legal issues around liability 
when orders are breached. However, according to 
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will be achieved and the potential friction with legal 
and ethical protection of personal data, privacy and 
the rehabilitation of offenders, are yet to be fully 
explored in both the policy and academic literature. 
Furthermore, while some academic research has 
been conducted on media reporting of courts 
(eg, frequency, type, etc), there is insufficient reliable 
academic or judicial data on the impact on the 
frequency and type of media interventions to protect 
open justice. Further empirical and doctrinal research 
on this aspect, beyond our discussion here, would 
help inform the development of robust open justice 
protections within contemporary and digitised courts. 
 Beyond new research, we urge policymakers and 
lawmakers to take a more introspective, if pragmatic, 
approach to open justice. Open justice cannot 
be assumed to be done in the absence of media 
presence and challenge. We opened our article with 
Lord Justice Toulson ’ s observation that the practical 
application of open justice  ‘ may need reconsideration 
from time to time ’ . We agree, but further assert 
that such an exercise is, in fact, imperative on a 
frequent basis, given the complex interplay between 
technology and rights. 
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of orders (particularly whether orders are complete 
blanket bans or narrower in scope), data about 
the general subject matter of orders (eg, evidence, 
identities, etc), grounds (eg, administration of 
justice, national security, privacy, etc), data about 
the duration of orders, and the identities of the 
applicants (eg, claimant, victim, defendant, the 
Crown, etc). Such information would not only 
provide the public with information regarding the 
state of open justice, it would also enable policy 
makers, as it has in a number of Australian studies, 166 
to readily assess on a routine basis how the open 
justice principle is operating in practice, and whether 
intervention through reform efforts might need to be 
explored. 
 VConclusion 
 In this article we have argued that the mainstream 
media cannot be relied upon as a sole safeguard for 
transparency in the English and Australian courts; 
traditional broadcasters and newspapers may not 
have the commercial resources or the inclination to 
attend, report and intervene in court, or to necessarily 
represent wider public interest concerns that are not 
aligned with industry perceptions of newsworthiness. 
While the media can and do offer a partial protection 
of open justice, new approaches are needed. We 
suggest that an independent state-appointed open 
justice advocate provides one possible mechanism. 
Such independent oversight would also help to 
monitor the impact of the courts ’ modernisation 
initiatives on open justice. 
 Digital developments promise better transparency and 
access in the interests of court users and the broader 
public; however, the question of how open justice 
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